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ABSTRACT 54 
Loss of habitats or ecosystems arising from development projects (e.g. infrastructure, resource 55 
extraction, urban expansion) are frequently addressed through biodiversity offsetting. As currently 56 
implemented, offsetting typically requires an outcome of ‘no net loss’ of biodiversity, but only 57 
relative to a baseline trajectory of biodiversity decline. This type of ‘relative’ no net loss entrenches 58 
ongoing biodiversity loss, and is misaligned with biodiversity targets that require ‘absolute’ no net 59 
loss or ‘net gain’. Here, we review the limitations of biodiversity offsetting, and in response, propose 60 
a new framework for compensating for biodiversity losses from development in a way that is aligned 61 
explicitly with jurisdictional biodiversity targets. In the framework, targets for particular biodiversity 62 
features are achieved via one of three pathways: Net Gain, No Net Loss, or (rarely) Managed Net 63 
Loss. We outline how to set the type (‘Maintenance’ or ‘Improvement’) and amount of ecological 64 
compensation that is appropriate for proportionately contributing to the achievement of different 65 
targets. This framework advances ecological compensation beyond a reactive, ad-hoc response, to 66 
ensuring alignment between actions addressing residual biodiversity losses and achievement of 67 
overarching targets for biodiversity conservation.  68 
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INTRODUCTION 69 
The 196 Parties to the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) are currently setting ambitious post-70 
2020 biodiversity targets (Mace et al., 2018; Visconti et al., 2019). Yet, despite widespread 71 
recognition of the need to slow and ultimately halt biodiversity loss, transformation of the natural 72 
world for infrastructure, industry, commercial agriculture, urbanisation and resource extraction 73 
(hereafter, ‘development’) continues to drive declines (IPBES, 2019). Ceasing all such transformation 74 
is not feasible in the face of desirable development imperatives (Griggs et al., 2013; United Nations, 75 
2018). Governments, developers and civil society therefore need tools for reconciling development 76 
and conservation to reduce the rate of biodiversity loss. 77 
The mitigation hierarchy is an approach for responding to biodiversity losses arising from 78 
development. It has been embedded into numerous government, lender and corporate policies 79 
(BBOP, 2012; Gardner et al., 2013; IFC, 2012; IUCN, 2018a; Rainey et al., 2014). Proponents of 80 
development projects—where these are mandated by policy (‘regulated sectors’)—are required to 81 
reduce adverse biodiversity outcomes through sequentially following four steps. Only after 82 
completing avoidance, and then restoration/rehabilitation of disturbed areas onsite, should the 83 
fourth step be taken – compensating for any residual losses through biodiversity offsetting. When 84 
applied as the final step of the mitigation hierarchy, biodiversity offsets are typically intended to 85 
achieve an outcome in which there is (at least) ‘no net loss’ of the impacted biodiversity due to a 86 
particular project (BBOP, 2012; Bull, Gordon, Watson, & Maron, 2016; IUCN, 2016). 87 
Biodiversity offsetting, however, is almost never designed to align with the achievement of national 88 
or sub-national (‘jurisdictional’) biodiversity targets that aim to halt species and ecosystem decline, 89 
or achieve biodiversity recovery. In large part, this is because no net loss of biodiversity at the level 90 
of individual development projects can mean something quite different to no net loss at the 91 
jurisdictional level (Maron, Brownlie, et al., 2018). When framed in relation to a jurisdictional 92 
biodiversity target, no net loss implies that the amount of a particular biodiversity feature (e.g. 93 
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forest) should not fall below what we have now; in other words, it means no net loss relative to a 94 
‘fixed reference scenario’ (Maron, Brownlie, et al., 2018). Under such a scenario, any lost forest (for 95 
example) would need to be replaced to achieve absolute no net loss – that is, to maintain the 96 
amount of forest at its current level (Figure 1).  97 
This is rarely the intended meaning of no net loss in offset policies which guide compensation for 98 
residual losses at the development project level, not the jurisdictional level. Project-level no net loss 99 
is often framed relative to a counterfactual scenario of decline, in which biodiversity is expected to 100 
be lost even without the development (and its offset) (Maron, Bull, Evans, & Gordon, 2015; IUCN, 101 
2016). The rationale is that the protection provided by the offset action achieves a benefit by 102 
averting a loss or decline that would otherwise have occurred. Such ‘averted loss’ offsetting (also 103 
called avoided loss or protection offsetting) is one of the two main forms of biodiversity offsetting 104 
(the other being restoration). It is referenced as a key approach to offsetting in policies and 105 
standards espoused by financial institutions (IFC, 2012; World Bank Group, 2016), multistakeholder 106 
platforms (BBOP, 2012; IUCN, 2016) and jurisdictions (Australia, Columbia and Chile (Maron, 107 
Brownlie et al., 2018)). In a global review of over 12,000 individual offsets projects, Bull and Strange 108 
(2018) found that approximately 66% used averted loss offsetting, either exclusively, or in 109 
combination with other measures. 110 
When framed this way, even best-practice offsets result in less biodiversity over time, as protection 111 
of already-existing biodiversity, which is expected to decline in the future, can be exchanged for 112 
biodiversity losses at the development site(s) (Bekessy et al., 2010; Buschke, Brownlie, & Manuel, 113 
2017; Maron, Brownlie, et al., 2018; Moilanen & Laitila, 2016). Across multiple projects, offsetting 114 
that achieves no net loss relative to a counterfactual scenario of biodiversity decline maintains the 115 
declining trend, and corresponds with a net loss at the jurisdictional level (Figure 1) (Gibbons & 116 
Lindenmayer, 2007; Quétier, van Teeffelen, Pilgrim, von Hase, & ten Kate, 2015).  117 
 118 
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<Figure 1> 119 
 120 
Relative no net loss of biodiversity at the project level does not equate with the achievement of 121 
absolute no net loss at the jurisdictional level. This mismatch causes conceptual confusion and 122 
ambiguity about the meaning and intention of no net loss as a policy objective. It also makes it hard 123 
to assess the contribution that project-level compensatory actions (e.g. biodiversity offsetting) are 124 
making to broader conservation goals, such as the achievement of jurisdictional biodiversity targets 125 
(Maron, Brownlie, et al., 2018). We are aware of only one national policy that links compensatory 126 
actions to the achievement of a target (limiting ecosystem loss to pre-defined thresholds) – South 127 
Africa’s Draft National Biodiversity Offset Policy (Republic of South Africa, 2017). If offsetting 128 
continues to occur in isolation from broader conservation imperatives, the risk is that at best, 129 
offsetting will contribute minimally to conservation objectives, and at worst, will detract from 130 
achieving such goals (e.g. where counterfactual-based approaches entrench ongoing declines 131 
(Maron, Brownlie et al., 2018)). An overarching framework is therefore needed to align project-level 132 
actions under the mitigation hierarchy, particularly of ecological compensation for residual losses, 133 
with the biodiversity targets that a jurisdiction may strive to achieve.   134 
Here, we propose such a framework, and review its suitability in applied conservation policy. We 135 
refer throughout to ‘ecological compensation’ to distinguish our proposed approach as an 136 
alternative to the narrower concept of biodiversity offsetting, which has strict rules about like-for-137 
like trades in biodiversity and aims to achieve at least no net loss relative to a counterfactual 138 
scenario (BBOP, 2012; Bull et al., 2016; IUCN, 2016). We discuss the consequences of different 139 
approaches to ecological compensation, and provide guidance on how, where and when the 140 
framework we present could be operationalised. This framework entails several advantages over 141 
current practice. First, it makes explicit the contribution of ecological compensation towards 142 
meeting jurisdictional biodiversity targets. Second, it avoids the need for complex (and highly 143 
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uncertain) calculations of the counterfactual scenario. Third, it strengthens the focus on avoidance, 144 
because it explicitly identifies instances where biodiversity losses require proportionate increases 145 
through actions like restoration, which will not always be a feasible option. Fourth, it provides 146 
conceptual clarity; the net outcome across impact and compensation sites for a particular project 147 
would align with the desired net outcome at the jurisdictional level. 148 
Jurisdictional-level biodiversity targets 149 
The framework we propose is general, and can apply to any biodiversity targets that describe a 150 
desired state of biodiversity (‘outcome-based targets’) at any jurisdictional scale. Target-setting is 151 
not a part of the framework, but the existence of quantifiable targets is a pre-requisite for its 152 
implementation. Indeed, the targets that we refer to in this framework should be set independently 153 
of, and have primacy over, policy relating to the mitigation hierarchy and compensation. This is to 154 
prevent targets being designed to facilitate a particular policy approach. 155 
Biodiversity targets are a familiar concept. Under the CBD Strategic Plan for Biodiversity 2010-2020 156 
(UN CBD, 2010), more than 160 Parties to the CBD already have targets for biodiversity conservation 157 
laid out in their National Biodiversity Strategy and Action Plans (a response to the 20 global Aichi 158 
Targets agreed in 2010) (UNEP, 2019). However, these are often not outcomes-based targets (IUCN, 159 
2018b) – a reflection of the fact that the Aichi Targets themselves are predominantly non-160 
quantifiable, and lack focus on desired outcomes (Barnes, Glew, Wyborn, & Craigie, 2018; Butchart, 161 
Di Marco, & Watson, 2016).  162 
As Parties to the CBD negotiate the post-2020 global biodiversity framework, there are increasing 163 
calls for clear, quantifiable science-based targets for the retention and recovery of biodiversity and 164 
nature (Dinerstein et al., 2019; Mace et al., 2018; Maron, Simmonds, & Watson, 2018; Visconti et al., 165 
2019; Watson & Venter, 2017). Such targets should be incorporated in national plans and actions, 166 
and linked to the achievement of broader global goals (IUCN, 2018b; Mace et al., 2018). Plentiful 167 
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guidance on target-setting is available (Butchart et al., 2016; Carwardine, Klein, Wilson, Pressey, & 168 
Possingham, 2009; Di Marco, Watson, Venter, & Possingham, 2016; Doherty et al., 2018; Maron, 169 
Simmonds, et al., 2018; Maxwell et al., 2015; Watson & Venter, 2017). The framework we present 170 
requires that targets are measurable, and explicitly reflect the desired state (outcome) of the 171 
biodiversity feature (e.g. species population, ecosystem extent) on which the target focusses, rather 172 
than a desired rate of change, or a mechanism for achieving the target. Examples of such targets 173 
that already exist include the French Government’s pledge to support and maintain a population of 174 
500 wolves for the years 2018 to 2023 (Republique Francaise, 2018), and ecosystem-specific 175 
retention thresholds that are incorporated into South Africa’s Draft National Offset Policy (Brownlie 176 
et al., 2017 (see Supporting Information 1)). 177 
RESULTS 178 
Aligning ecological compensation with biodiversity targets 179 
In this framework, targeted conservation outcomes such as desired species populations or minimum 180 
ecosystem extents are set in absolute terms at the jurisdictional level. The required trajectory 181 
needed to achieve a target for a particular species, assemblage or ecosystem (hereafter, 182 
‘biodiversity feature’) depends on the level (e.g. number, amount, area) of the biodiversity feature 183 
when the jurisdictional-level target for that biodiversity feature was set (Figure 2).  184 
 185 
<Figure 2> 186 
 187 
When a biodiversity feature is approximately at the target level ongoing ‘No Net Loss’ is required. All 188 
losses of the biodiversity feature need to be balanced by proportionate gains in order to maintain 189 
the biodiversity feature at the target level. It follows that when a biodiversity feature is below the 190 
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target level, ‘Net Gain’ is needed to achieve the target, whereby the biodiversity feature increases in 191 
absolute terms to (at least) the point where the target is met. ‘Managed Net Loss’ may be 192 
appropriate in exceptional circumstances when a biodiversity feature is above its target. Setting a 193 
target below current levels might require that: (1) the particular biodiversity feature is very common 194 
and widespread; (2) some losses at the jurisdictional level can occur without compromising the 195 
ecological integrity and function of the feature (e.g. population viability, intactness); and (3) 196 
continued, strictly managed drawdown to a pre-determined target level is socially acceptable.   197 
Once a jurisdiction has established targets, and thus specified the required trajectory for its 198 
biodiversity features, project-level actions under the mitigation hierarchy can be designed to 199 
contribute to achieving these targets. The approach to compensating for residual losses at the 200 
project level depends upon several factors. The type of compensatory action depends on whether 201 
achievement of the jurisdictional biodiversity target requires Net Gain, No Net Loss, or occasionally 202 
in specific situations allows for Managed Net Loss. The amount of compensation required for any 203 
given project is guided by the amount of residual loss, how much of the affected biodiversity feature 204 
remains relative to its particular target, and policy decisions regarding the share of responsibility 205 
among sectors. Below, we set out each consideration. 206 
Achieving jurisdictional outcomes – Improvement, Maintenance and Avoidance 207 
There are two broad types of ecological compensation in this framework: Maintenance and 208 
Improvement. By ‘Maintenance’ we mean preventing a threat to ensure persistence of a biodiversity 209 
feature at its current condition, extent or population (and conservation status), for example by 210 
legally securing existing biodiversity at a compensation site. The aim of Maintenance is to prevent 211 
existing biodiversity from being lost at a site in the future (i.e. avert future losses). The net result of 212 
Maintenance interventions across a jurisdiction is a reduction in the biodiversity feature, because 213 
the loss from development is compensated for by securing the persistence of the biodiversity 214 
feature at another site(s), where it already exists.  215 
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This contrasts with ‘Improvement’, which involves producing a quantifiable increase in the 216 
biodiversity feature. Improvement can take a range of forms, and result from a variety of 217 
interventions such as habitat enhancement (e.g. improving condition of native vegetation) or 218 
removal of pervasive pressures to allow populations to increase (e.g. invasive species control). In 219 
reality, the interventions that achieve Maintenance and Improvement at a site can overlap—legally 220 
securing a site and managing it at a moderate intensity might preserve that site’s condition 221 
(Maintenance), but if management intensity is increased it might achieve Improvement; similarly, 222 
legal protection of a degraded site might over time allow its recovery (Improvement). Generally, 223 
Improvement will require complementary Maintenance as a necessary  prerequisite (e.g. securing a 224 
site containing the focal biodiversity feature or its habitat, with a view to improving it). 225 
Enhancing biodiversity, including via Improvement compensation actions, is ultimately essential for 226 
achieving jurisdictional-level No Net Loss or Net Gain—only by increasing the extent and/or 227 
condition or amount of a biodiversity feature can No Net Loss (or Net Gain) be achieved under this 228 
framework (Figure 3a and 3b). When carefully linked to biodiversity targets, Maintenance can be 229 
used to contribute to Managed Net Loss, until such time that the target is reached, after which 230 
Improvement becomes an essential response to any permitted losses (Figure 3c). Further, while 231 
Maintenance alone cannot achieve No Net Loss or Net Gain at the jurisdictional level, it may be a 232 
necessary transitional intervention to ultimately achieving these outcomes in the common situation 233 
where a biodiversity feature is (1) below its target; and (2) experiencing rapid and ongoing loss from 234 
unregulated pressures, where the mitigation hierarchy is not fully applied. In these circumstances, 235 
compensation through Maintenance may be appropriate for a transitional period alongside or in 236 
advance of compensation through Improvement (Figure 3d). However, for such an approach to be a 237 
step towards a No Net Loss or Net Gain, transition phases with strict limits must be set (see 238 
Supporting Information 1).    239 
 240 
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<Figure 3> 241 
 242 
Because this framework explicitly links ecological compensation requirements with jurisdictional-243 
level target outcomes, it strengthens the focus on rigorously applying the earlier steps of the 244 
mitigation hierarchy. Jurisdictional No Net Loss or Net Gain cannot occur without losses being 245 
compensated by Improvement actions such as restoration or increases in species’ populations. 246 
However, for some biodiversity features, achieving such gains through actions like restoration is 247 
either hampered by great uncertainty, or is simply not possible (given, for example, substantial time 248 
lags) (Curran, Hellweg, & Beck, 2014; Gibbons et al., 2016; Maron et al., 2012; Moilanen, van 249 
Teeffelen, Ben-Haim, & Ferrier, 2009; Pilgrim et al., 2013). This reality limits considerably the types 250 
of biodiversity features for which No Net Loss or Net Gain are feasible. Losses of irreplaceable 251 
biodiversity features simply cannot be managed though a compensation approach, unless the 252 
jurisdictional target involves Managed Net Loss. If an outcome of further (managed net) loss is 253 
unacceptable, the only option is more rigorously to apply the earlier steps in the mitigation 254 
hierarchy, and avoid losses entirely. 255 
The amount of compensation required for a given loss  256 
This target-based framework no longer depends upon the complex and often counterintuitive 257 
process of defining dynamic counterfactual scenarios to establish what type of action, and how 258 
much, is required to compensate for a given loss (as offsetting does). This is because instead of a 259 
dynamic counterfactual scenario, a reference point fixed at a particular level—the target—is used. 260 
The amount of compensation required for any given project is determined by both how much 261 
residual loss a particular biodiversity feature experiences as a result of a development project, and 262 
the pathway (e.g. No Net Loss) required to achieve a target, along with several additional 263 
considerations (outlined below) that are factored into the calculation of a compensation ratio. The 264 
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compensation ratios (sometimes called a ‘multiplier’) detailed here only need to be established 265 
once—at the inception of a compensation scheme—and should be applied consistently to all 266 
projects.  267 
The compensation ratio sets the amount of Improvement or Maintenance required per unit of 268 
residual loss to contribute to the achievement of a target, as depicted in Figure 3. The first step in 269 
calculating the compensation ratio is to estimate how much of the affected biodiversity feature (𝑥𝑥) 270 
exists relative to its target (at time 𝑡𝑡 = 0, when the target, 𝐵𝐵, was set). The current amount of 𝑥𝑥 271 
comprises two parts: how much of what exists is already considered effectively protected from 272 
adverse impacts (e.g., fully resourced protected areas) or planned to be so protected (𝑥𝑥𝑝𝑝(0)); and 273 
how much of what exists could still conceivably be lost (including because of development projects) 274 
(𝑥𝑥𝑎𝑎(0)). Places identified as being under effective protection (𝑥𝑥𝑝𝑝) are not available to be used for 275 
compensation. 276 
Where No Net Loss or Net Gain is needed to achieve a target, the amount of compensation (gain via 277 
Improvement) required for a given unit of loss to a particular biodiversity feature is: 278 
[Equation 1] 279 
𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑪 𝒓𝒓𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑪 (𝑰𝑰𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑪𝒓𝒓𝑪𝑪𝑰𝑰𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑪) = �𝑩𝑩 − 𝒙𝒙𝑪𝑪(𝟎𝟎)�
𝒙𝒙𝑪𝑪(𝟎𝟎)  280 
 281 
Where Managed Net Loss is appropriate, the amount of compensation (securing existing biodiversity 282 
via Maintenance) required for a given unit of loss to a particular biodiversity feature is: 283 
[Equation 2] 284 
𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑪 𝒓𝒓𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑪 (𝑴𝑴𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑴𝑴𝑪𝑪) = �𝑩𝑩 − 𝒙𝒙𝑪𝑪(𝟎𝟎)
𝒙𝒙(𝟎𝟎) −𝑩𝑩 � 285 
 286 
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For the transitional approach (Figure 3d), Equation 2 is used to set Maintenance requirements to 287 
ensure that an interim target (threshold) of 𝐵𝐵𝐼𝐼 is not breached, before switching to Improvement 288 
using Equation 1 to achieve the desired target. More details on calculating the Improvement and 289 
Maintenance compensation ratios (including for transitional approach) are provided in Supporting 290 
Information 1 and Supporting Information 2. 291 
To exemplify these ratios, compensation for a project-level loss of 100 ha of habitat, consistent with 292 
Net Gain linked to a target of doubling the currently-available habitat for a species, requires an 293 
Improvement ratio of 2:1. This is based on assumptions that none of the biodiversity feature is 294 
currently protected, and all adverse impacts to this biodiversity feature are regulated (i.e. follow the 295 
mitigation hierarchy). Here, a ratio 2:1 requires that 200 ha of ‘new’ equivalent habitat must be 296 
successfully created (and maintained) to compensate for the loss. Similarly, Managed Net Loss in 297 
which 90% of a remaining ecosystem is to be retained would require a Maintenance ratio of 9:1, 298 
wherein nine times the area of residual loss is secured and retained into the future. Again, this 299 
assumes no current protection of the ecosystem, and no unregulated losses. If, say, half the 300 
remaining ecosystem was already effectively protected, the ratio would be 4:1. 301 
These compensation ratios can vary with policy settings. For example, the ratios presented above 302 
are based on a proportionate contribution towards the achievement of the target. In other words, a 303 
unit of loss caused by a regulated sector requires the same amount of compensation as would a unit 304 
of unregulated loss (the liability for which accrues, in effect, to the jurisdictional government) in 305 
order to progress toward the target. However, in some instances a jurisdiction may require sectors 306 
that are regulated to contribute disproportionately towards a target’s achievement. For example, 307 
the jurisdiction may require that some sectors make additional contributions towards a biodiversity 308 
target, beyond just compensating for their own impacts. Alternatively, the government may 309 
shoulder some of the responsibility for compensation to limit the requirements on certain sectors. 310 
Government decisions about proportionate or disproportionate responsibility and policy scope 311 
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(which sectors or type of impact are regulated) can affect both compensation ratios for regulated 312 
sectors and the amount of responsibility that falls on governments to address losses that are 313 
contrary to the required trajectory needed to achieve target commitments. Therefore, they must be 314 
made and factored in at the point of policy development when ratios are calculated (i.e. prior to the 315 
policy’s implementation) (Supporting Information 2). This allows for transparency and clarity about 316 
which actor must do what action, how much of it, and why, to compensate for residual impacts in 317 
line with meeting desired targets. 318 
Time lags in and uncertainty about achievement of compensatory outcomes are also often dealt 319 
with by adjusting ratios. These factors can be incorporated in this approach by increasing the ratios 320 
as appropriate (Bull, Lloyd, & Strange, 2017; Laitila, Moilanen, & Pouzols, 2014; Moilanen & Kotiaho, 321 
2018). This particularly applies to Improvement, where the unadjusted ratio assumes full and certain 322 
compensation instantly. The compensation ratio for Improvement thus gives the minimum 323 
compensation required for a particular unit of loss (to contribute to achievement of the target), and 324 
would need to be increased accordingly to account for time lags and uncertainties (e.g. restoration 325 
not being fully successful (Maron et al., 2012; Moilanen et al., 2009)). 326 
Contrast with counterfactual-based offsetting 327 
Both target-based ecological compensation, as described in this framework, and counterfactual-328 
based offsetting, require strict adherence to the mitigation hierarchy, quantification of residual 329 
losses, and determination of compensatory requirements for these losses. The fundamental 330 
difference lies in how the compensation required for a particular biodiversity feature is calculated—331 
now based on the overall jurisdictional biodiversity target and on policy choices for how to achieve 332 
it, rather than a project-specific assessment underpinned by complex counterfactual scenarios. This, 333 
and other differences, are summarised in Table 1. We note that some jurisdictions may lack the 334 
enabling environment to (1) develop and implement compensatory policy; and (2) determine and 335 
enact either targets for biodiversity conservation, or mechanisms for their achievement. In 336 
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circumstances such as these, counterfactual-based offsetting may be more appropriate, although 337 
this should be considered a temporary solution given its inherent propensity for the uncapped 338 
drawdown of biodiversity. As long as appropriate, scientifically-robust biodiversity targets can be set, 339 
we propose that a move toward a target-based approach is desirable.  340 
 341 
<Table 1> 342 
 343 
DISCUSSION 344 
While in its totality, target-based ecological compensation represents a novel alternative to the 345 
prevailing biodiversity offsetting paradigm, its component parts are familiar, with most aspects of 346 
existing standards remaining applicable (BBOP, 2012; Gardner et al., 2013; Gelcich, Vargas, Carreras, 347 
Castilla, & Donlan, 2017; IUCN, 2016). A target-based system involves changes only to the final step 348 
of the well-established mitigation hierarchy, primarily relating to the sizing of compensatory 349 
requirements. The on-ground actions (improving or maintaining biodiversity in a particular place) are 350 
no different to those in current offsetting practice, and are subject to the same challenges that 351 
affect these, and indeed most, applied conservation activities. Biodiversity targets are already 352 
central in international and jurisdictional policy. Target-based ecological compensation simply helps 353 
to connect project-level responses to these broad biodiversity targets to achieve desirable outcomes 354 
for stakeholders and biodiversity. It should be implemented synergistically with other conservation 355 
and sustainable development considerations – trading up, landscape-level planning, and impacts to 356 
people (see Supporting Information 3). 357 
A shift to the approach we propose carries risks. First, changing existing regulations, which 358 
(currently) promote averted loss offsetting, may result in sub-optimal biodiversity outcomes if the 359 
biggest gains (in the short-term) can be made by protecting highly-threatened biodiversity from 360 
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unmanaged pressures. Our framework deals with this by incorporating a ‘phased approach’ (see 361 
above; Supporting Information 1). Second, having outcomes-based targets places a level of 362 
accountability on those who set the target, and those who are required to contribute to its 363 
achievement. This may encourage the setting of ‘easy’ or unambitious targets, which may lead to 364 
small compensatory requirements. This underscores the need for science-based targets that are 365 
established independently of the design of the compensatory scheme. As long as such targets exist, 366 
the simplicity of calculating compensatory requirements and the transparency of the contribution 367 
this makes to a specific goal, lends itself to higher certainty for all stakeholders, and more 368 
straightforward regulatory monitoring and compliance auditing. 369 
Operationalising target-based ecological compensation can draw on lessons from other policy 370 
frameworks. For example, REDD+ is a mechanism under the UNFCCC where local forest protection 371 
contributes to achieving broader goals (carbon emissions targets). Challenges have been identified 372 
regarding multi-level governance, relating to accounting (e.g. carbon crediting, incentives) and 373 
implementation (e.g. decision-making) (Cortez et al., 2010; Ravikumar et al., 2015). This has 374 
prompted the development of implementation frameworks (e.g. ‘nested’ approach proposed by 375 
Cortez et al. 2010), from which a key lesson is that the achievement of national targets is reliant on 376 
actors operating at multiple scales, thus necessitating protocols for their engagement, including in 377 
decision-making and benefit sharing. In light of the REDD+ experience, coordination among actors, 378 
and especially those undertaking projects ‘on the ground’, to contribute to the achievement of 379 
jurisdictional biodiversity targets, will be crucial for successful implementation of target-based 380 
ecological compensation. 381 
In Brazil, requirements for the protection of a minimum proportion of native vegetation on private 382 
properties (legal reserves under the ‘Forest Code’) aim to help achieve bioregional vegetation 383 
retention targets. Brazil’s overall approach has the benefit of transparency in desired outcomes, with 384 
mechanisms designed explicitly to achieve it (Metzger et al., 2019). However, criticism of its 385 
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restrictiveness for business and landholders have led to relaxations of its requirements over time 386 
(e.g. amnesty for illegal deforestation on small properties (Soares-Filho et al., 2014)), and even calls 387 
for it to be extinguished (Metzger et al. 2019)). This underscores the risk of implementing any 388 
environmental regulation that is reliant on contributions from industry and private individuals to 389 
achieve a broader public-good goal (e.g. explicit environmental targets). 390 
A target-based ecological compensation approach would be most effective when developed as a 391 
coordinated jurisdictional policy, with both jurisdictional net outcomes set and 392 
Improvement/Maintenance compensation ratios calculated at the outset. The main enabling 393 
conditions (or conversely, barriers to implementation, where these conditions are lacking) for 394 
embedding the approach at the jurisdictional level include basic information on the extent/amount 395 
and condition of the biodiversity features that would be the focus of the policy, including how much 396 
is considered to be already effectively protected, and regulatory control of at least some sectors that 397 
cause biodiversity loss. Taken together, these would allow for the calculation of compensation ratios 398 
and identification of valid locations for compensation. Once this (non-trivial) work is done, the 399 
project-level process of identifying suitable ecological compensation would be greatly simplified.  400 
In addition to government policy, most multilateral finance institutions reference ‘no net loss’ and 401 
even ‘net gain’ requirements in relation to escalating biodiversity risks.  For example, IFC 402 
Performance Standard 6 requires no net loss where feasible in natural habitats, while net gain is 403 
required for critical habitats (IFC, 2012). The simplified ratio-based protocol that is embedded in the 404 
target-based approach could facilitate investment by these institutions, and, represents a desirable 405 
objective for those multilateral finance institutions with mandates to engage the public sector on 406 
policy reform to facilitate sustainable development. 407 
Regardless of whether embedded in government policy or industry/corporate standards, this 408 
framework does not imply that proponents of development projects are expected to bear the entire 409 
burden of a jurisdiction achieving its particular biodiversity targets, nor that compensation alone be 410 
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used to achieve targets. Indeed, the share that falls on developers is a policy decision for 411 
governments (See Results; Supporting Information 2). Fundamentally, it offers a systematic 412 
approach to determining project-level compensation that is consistent with the achievement of 413 
jurisdictional biodiversity targets. The more comprehensive the policy’s scope—that is, the more 414 
sectors that are regulated and required to compensate for losses to biodiversity arising from their 415 
activities—the greater the contribution of proponents of development to meeting a jurisdiction’s 416 
biodiversity targets.  417 
However, it will rarely, if ever, be the case that a compensatory policy is broad enough in scope to 418 
capture all processes that result in the loss of biodiversity. This means that actors other than 419 
proponents of development projects (e.g. governments) will need to address losses to biodiversity 420 
that are beyond the scope of compensatory policy—the unregulated losses—in combination with a 421 
wide suite of other complementary conservation actions that are implemented to contribute to 422 
meeting targets. This ecological compensation framework involves setting out clearly the 423 
expectation for both proponents of development and jurisdictional authorities as this relates to how 424 
to address losses of biodiversity, whereby compensatory actions alongside other conservation 425 
investment can contribute to achieving biodiversity targets.  426 
Ecological compensation should always be an option of last resort. In instances where the 427 
biodiversity features that are exposed to residual project losses are imperilled and irreplaceable—in 428 
other words, they cannot be feasibly improved or recreated—ecological compensation is not 429 
acceptable, and losses must be avoided altogether. Where residual losses can be reasonably 430 
addressed through compensatory interventions, this target-based framework provides a pathway 431 
towards more transparent and effective outcomes. It explicitly links compensatory actions to 432 
broader biodiversity targets, and clarifies and simplifies the expectations on and requirements of 433 
developers. In this regard, it represents a step towards the coordinated planning and integrated 434 
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actions that will be crucial to stem and reverse biodiversity losses in the face of ongoing 435 
development pressures. 436 
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Table 1. Comparison between counterfactual-based offsetting and target-based ecological 590 
compensation. 591 
 Advantages Risks and challenges 
Counterfactual-based 
offsetting (aiming for 
no net loss relative to a 
counterfactual 
scenario) 
• Can be implemented in the 
absence of any articulated 
conservation targets 
• Increases the attention on the 
difference made by a 
conservation intervention 
• Can be implemented for 
individual projects in poorly-
regulated settings 
• Main concepts and approaches 
familiar to many practitioners / 
policy makers 
• Outcomes are relative to a dynamic 
counterfactual trajectory that cannot be 
known in advance, only estimated 
• Biodiversity decline continues even 
though a project may achieve no net loss 
relative to a declining counterfactual 
• Constructing robust counterfactuals is 
conceptually complex and can be data-
hungry 
• The type and amount of offset action 
required is highly sensitive to 
assumptions about the counterfactual 
trajectory 
• The end point of the biodiversity 
trajectory is implicit or unknown 
• Relatively easy to manipulate the 
counterfactual and thus undermine the 
net outcome 
Target-based 
ecological 
compensation (aiming 
for net jurisdictional 
outcomes aligned with 
• Aligns outcomes of actions 
regulated by compensatory 
policy with overarching 
conservation objectives 
• Requires articulation of conservation 
targets, potentially creating incentive to 
‘set bar low’ to facilitate ‘business as 
usual’ compensatory policy (not 
advocated by this framework) 
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specific biodiversity 
targets)  
• Outcomes are explicit and 
relative to a fixed, known point 
in time 
• ‘No Net Loss’, ‘Net Gain’ and 
‘Managed Net Loss’ have 
intuitive meanings 
• Standardises calculation of the 
type and amount of 
compensation required 
• Complex, dynamic 
counterfactual scenarios are not 
required 
• Requires estimate of the difference 
between the target state and current 
state of impacted biodiversity features 
• When targets are at odds with actions 
occurring or planned outside the scope of 
the compensatory policy, target-based 
actions can be suboptimal 
• Target-based ecological compensation is 
a relatively new concept (although 
similar approaches exist in some 
jurisdictions) and will take adjustment  
  592 
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 593 
Figure 1. ‘No net loss’ relating to different reference scenarios. No net loss at the jurisdictional level 594 
implies that loss is stopped in absolute terms compared to a fixed reference scenario – i.e. that all 595 
biodiversity losses are addressed by gains of the same size, thus maintaining biodiversity at the same 596 
level compared to before the loss occurred (a). However, in reality, no net loss commitments 597 
frequently only require that individual projects achieve no net loss relative to a declining 598 
counterfactual, by protecting biodiversity that might otherwise be lost in the future due to 599 
unregulated impacts (‘averted loss’) (b). Such project-level no net loss results in ongoing loss of 600 
biodiversity at the jurisdictional level, albeit at a slower rate (figure adapted from Maron, Brownlie, 601 
et al. (2018)).  602 
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 603 
Figure 2. Aligning ecological compensation with jurisdictional biodiversity targets starts with 604 
establishing the trajectory required to achieve net target outcomes. The required trajectory depends 605 
on whether a biodiversity feature is below, at, or above its jurisdictional biodiversity target at the 606 
time the target is set (‘now’).   607 
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 608 
Figure 3. Illustration of the target-based ecological compensation approach for contributing to the 609 
achievement of a) No Net Loss; b) Net Gain; c) Managed Net Loss; and d) Net Gain using a 610 
transitional approach in which Maintenance actions can be undertaken for a period of time to help 611 
stem unregulated losses, before Improvement actions become the default requirement. The dashed 612 
line on each plot represents the target level (B) for the biodiversity feature. The indicative amount of 613 
Improvement and/or Maintenance (denoted by ‘+’) depends on the difference between the level of 614 
the biodiversity feature and the target (and in the case of the transitional approach (d)), the 615 
threshold (Bi) below which the biodiversity feature cannot decline) (see Supporting Information 1). 616 
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Importantly, compensation for residual losses from development is one of a suite of complementary 617 
measures to achieve the desired trajectory and ultimately achieve a target. At such time that the 618 
target is met, maintaining the biodiversity feature at this level requires losses to be compensated for 619 
by Improvement at a ratio of 1:1 (or targets could be revised towards ambitious new objectives). 620 
Moving from biodiversity offsets to a target-based approach for ecological compensation 
Simmonds et al. 
 
Supporting Information 1 
Calculating the compensation ratios in target-based ecological compensation 
The calculation of an ecological compensation requirement typically factors in a ratio (also called a 
‘multiplier’). The ratio is a number, usually greater than 1, which tells you how much of a biodiversity 
feature needs to be replaced/secured per unit of the feature lost. These ratios, in the past, have 
taken into account issues such as time discounting (biodiversity features produced in the future do 
not fully compensate for biodiversity features produced now), uncertainty, and risk of failure (Bull, 
Lloyd, & Strange, 2017; Laitila, Moilanen, & Pouzols, 2014; Moilanen, van Teeffelen, Ben-Haim, & 
Ferrier, 2009). 
Here, we present ratios that accommodate the need to meet target values for various biodiversity 
features in the landscape – for example, a target for the number of breeding individuals of a species 
might be a minimum of 10000, a target for the area of suitable habitat for a species might be 5000 
home ranges or more, a target for the area of a vegetation community in a region might be at least 
half of its original extent in good condition, which translates to a minimum area and condition score. 
The formulae below assume no time lags (e.g. in the case of Improvement, new features are created 
instantly). Issues such as time lags will modify the ratios in ways already described (Bull et al., 2017; 
Laitila et al., 2014; Moilanen & Kotiaho, 2018). 
Let 𝑥𝑥(𝑡𝑡) be the state of the biodiversity feature at time 𝑡𝑡 where 0 <= 𝑥𝑥(𝑡𝑡) <= 1 for all 𝑡𝑡. This is made 
up of two parts, the part that is permanently and effectively protected 𝑥𝑥𝑝𝑝(𝑡𝑡), which are places that 
are not available for any compensatory related change, and 𝑥𝑥𝑎𝑎(𝑡𝑡) which is the part that could be 
destroyed or used for compensation at the end of the mitigation hierarchy. Hence the amount of the 
biodiversity feature is the sum of the protected and available parts: 𝑥𝑥𝑝𝑝(𝑡𝑡) + 𝑥𝑥𝑎𝑎(𝑡𝑡) = 𝑥𝑥(𝑡𝑡) at all times. 
Further: 
Let 𝐵𝐵 be the target state of the biodiversity feature and we assume this is time independent 
(constant). 
The ratios we present below assume that (1) all sectors that cause loss of biodiversity will provide 
compensation; and (2) that each sector’s compensation will be a proportionate contribution to the 
achievement of the target (i.e. everyone compensates equally for the losses they cause). However, 
in some instances, not all causes of biodiversity loss will fall within the scope of policy that regulates 
implementation of the mitigation hierarchy. That is, the loss of biodiversity will be a function of 
regulated and unregulated losses. At the inception of a target-based ecological compensation policy, 
a government may choose to adjust compensation requirements (with implications for the 
calculation of compensation ratios) on sectors regulated by the mitigation hierarchy, in one of 
several ways: 
• Compensation from regulated development is disproportionately low. The government would 
need to address shortfalls arising from disproportionately low compensation.  
• Compensation from regulated development is disproportionately high. A disproportionately 
large share of achieving the target is placed on regulated sectors. 
• The achievement of the target is solely the responsibility of regulated sectors, by way of the 
compensation they provide for the losses they cause. 
Where there are unregulated losses that are going uncompensated, the requirement to address 
these in a way that is consistent with achieving targets accrues to other actors (e.g. the 
government). 
We provide examples of how these policy choices affect compensation ratios, and what this means 
for the responsibility that falls on both regulated sectors and governments, in an editable 
spreadsheet in Supplementary Information 2.  
 
Case 1:  No Net Loss; the biodiversity feature is at the target (𝒙𝒙(𝟎𝟎) = 𝑩𝑩) 
If there is no unregulated loss of the biodiversity feature, the compensation ratio (Improvement) is 
1. This also applies to all cases once targets are met. 
If there is unregulated loss of the biodiversity feature, then either: 
• the compensation ratio (Improvement) is 1 and the liability accrues to the authority (e.g. 
government) to create the biodiversity feature to compensate for unregulated loss; or  
• the compensation ratio is adjusted (increased) to enhance the share of the responsibility for 
achieving the target that falls on regulated sectors. 
 
Case 2:  Net Gain; the biodiversity feature is below the target (𝒙𝒙(𝟎𝟎) < 𝑩𝑩) 
The compensation ratio (Improvement) needs to be set so that, once (hypothetically) all of the 
(available for development) biodiversity feature at 𝑡𝑡 =  0  (𝑥𝑥𝑎𝑎(0)) has been lost, we have met the 
target. Hence the ratio is (𝐵𝐵 −  𝑥𝑥𝑝𝑝(0))/(𝑥𝑥(0) − 𝑥𝑥𝑝𝑝(0)) = (𝐵𝐵 −  𝑥𝑥𝑝𝑝(0))/𝑥𝑥𝑎𝑎(0), which is the inverse 
of the fraction of the available biodiversity feature that remains relative to the target. In the special 
case that none of target is effectively protected 𝑥𝑥𝑝𝑝(0) = 0 then this is 𝐵𝐵/𝑥𝑥𝑎𝑎(0). 
For example if the target is 𝐵𝐵 = 1000, the effectively protected amount is 𝑥𝑥𝑝𝑝(0) = 200, and the 
current total biodiversity feature state is 𝑥𝑥(0) = 600 (so the available amount of the biodiversity 
feature is 𝑥𝑥𝑎𝑎(0) = 400) then the compensation ratio (Improvement) is 2 assuming no unregulated 
losses. 
The compensation ratio (Improvement) can be summarised as follows: 
𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑪 𝒓𝒓𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑪 (𝑰𝑰𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑪𝒓𝒓𝑪𝑪𝑰𝑰𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑪) = �𝑩𝑩 − 𝒙𝒙𝑷𝑷(𝟎𝟎)
𝒙𝒙𝑪𝑪(𝟎𝟎) � 
 
Case 3:  Managed Net Loss; the biodiversity feature is above the target (𝒙𝒙(𝟎𝟎) > 𝑩𝑩) 
If there is no unregulated loss of the biodiversity feature and 𝑥𝑥𝑝𝑝(0)  >  𝐵𝐵, no compensation is 
necessary because we already have met our target in fully protected areas. 
 
 
If 𝑥𝑥𝑝𝑝(0)  <  𝐵𝐵, then the compensation ratio (Maintenance) is: 
𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑪 𝒓𝒓𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑪 (𝑴𝑴𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑴𝑴𝑪𝑪) = �𝑩𝑩 − 𝒙𝒙𝑪𝑪(𝟎𝟎)
𝒙𝒙(𝟎𝟎) −𝑩𝑩 � 
 
For example if the target is 𝐵𝐵 = 1000, the effectively protected amount is 𝑥𝑥𝑝𝑝(0) = 200, and the 
current total amount of the biodiversity feature is 𝑥𝑥(0) = 1400, then the compensation ratio 
(Maintenance) is 2.  
If the current state of the biodiversity feature (at 𝑡𝑡 = 0) is only marginally above the target (𝐵𝐵), then 
the compensation ratio (Maintenance) will be very large, and may be unfeasibly high to practically 
implement. For example, should 𝑥𝑥(0) = 10000, and 𝐵𝐵 = 9900 (implying a drawdown of 1% of the 
biodiversity feature to its target), the compensation ratio (Maintenance) will be 99:1 (assuming no 
unregulated losses, and no current protection). In such circumstances, a mixture of compensation 
provided using Maintenance only (as described above), and a separate calculation of compensation 
where Improvement is used according to a different (Managed Net Loss-specific Improvement) ratio 
calculation of �𝐵𝐵 − 𝑥𝑥𝑝𝑝(0)� /𝑥𝑥(0) , may be an option – and if effective Improvement is unfeasible for 
that biodiversity feature, then avoidance is the only way in which the target can be met. 
 
Provided below is an example of a Managed Net Loss protocol - South Africa’s Draft National 
Biodiversity Offset Policy and provincial guidelines.  
  
 
 
 
Box 1. Example of Managed Net Loss: South Africa Draft National Biodiversity Offset Policy and 
provincial guidelines 
 
This policy is designed to contribute to achieving specific biodiversity targets for terrestrial ecosystems 
(Brownlie et al., 2017; Buschke et al., 2017). The minimum extent of each ecosystem that must be retained 
intact (relative to its original or historical extent) has been determined based on a scientific process 
(Desmet & Cowling, 2004). These ecosystem extent thresholds – in effect, targets – guide compensation 
requirements. The amount of compensation for residual losses from development depends on how much 
of the impacted ecosystem remains, relative to its historical extent and target, and how much of it is 
formally protected.  
 
Where an ecosystem is below its retention threshold or target, development may not occur, other than 
under exceptional circumstances. For above-target ecosystems, compensation is done by protecting 
another place where the impacted ecosystem occurs using a Maintenance ratio scaled based on the 
difference between the current and desired minimum extent of the ecosystem and how much of it is 
protected. The net outcome in absolute terms is a Managed Net Loss – because the protected biodiversity 
existed at the time of the loss from the development. This target-based system carefully manages losses to 
avoid ecosystem extent falling below scientifically-robust thresholds. This policy avoids the ‘no net loss’ 
wording – because it is not designed to achieve no net loss.  
 
Case 4:  No Net Loss or Net Gain (transition) 
A potential limitation of target-based ecological compensation is that desired No Net Loss or Net 
Gain outcomes (e.g. Figure 3a and Figure 3b in main review article) may not be immediately feasible 
in a situation of steep, continued, unaddressed and unregulated biodiversity loss. Indeed, a focus 
solely on Improvement actions like restoration before large-scale biodiversity loss has ceased could 
even be counterproductive. In such cases, a phased transition designed to ultimately achieve No Net 
Loss or Net Gain outcomes, that is embedded in the principles of this target-based framework, may 
be the most appropriate approach (Figure 3d in main review article). 
The phased transition would temporarily accept a strictly controlled interim phase in which 
Maintenance (plus some Improvement, where feasible) interventions first aim to slow the decline of 
the biodiversity feature that is the focus of the compensation by securing sites where it currently 
exists (i.e. resembling a Managed Net Loss). Maintenance ratios in this phase would be designed not 
to achieve the ultimate desired target for that biodiversity feature, but to avoid breaching a pre-
defined threshold limit to loss (Figure 3d in main review article). The threshold would need to be set 
such that enough of the focal biodiversity (extent of ecosystem; population of species) remained to 
allow for recovery to be feasible. Well before the threshold is reached, the approach transitions to 
require an Improvement ratio such that the desired No Net Loss or Net Gain outcome can be 
approached over time as the trajectory of the focal biodiversity feature reverses. As for all 
jurisdictional No Net Loss and Net Gain outcomes, this is possible only for biodiversity features that 
can be ‘improved’, such as through restoration or interventions that drive population increase. 
Further, the lower the initial threshold, the larger the subsequent Improvement ratio must be to 
achieve the target.   
The phased transition to target-based compensation carries risks, but where a jurisdiction aims to, 
and can feasibly (in time) achieve a No Net Loss or Net Gain outcome for a particular biodiversity 
feature, and that same feature is in steep and ongoing decline, the short-term alternatives are few. 
They include: (1) immediate prevention of all actions causing biodiversity decline; (2) acceptance of 
less-ambitious biodiversity targets that allow for further drawdown of biodiversity, with 
compensatory policy designed to achieve an outcome of Managed Net Loss (i.e. capping ongoing 
losses at a pre-defined level); (3) use of counterfactual-based offsetting alongside unmanaged 
ongoing net losses; or (4) no compensation for losses at all – in other words unmanaged loss without 
limit – which poses serious risks for nature and people. 
Calculating compensation requirements where the ultimate outcome of No Net Loss or Net Gain is 
achieved using a transitional approach involves a combination of Cases 2 and 3, as described above. 
Compensation using Maintenance (Case 3) is used first, to secure existing elements of the 
biodiversity feature, in the face of ongoing and severe threats. The approach switches to 
compensation through Improvement (Case 2), well before the biodiversity feature reaches a pre-
determined threshold below which it is not permitted to decline. Thus, there is the intermediate 
threshold below which the biodiversity feature cannot decline (𝐵𝐵𝐼𝐼) and the ultimate (No Net Loss or 
Net Gain) target (𝐵𝐵). 
Critically, determining the intermediate threshold (𝐵𝐵𝐼𝐼) should be based primarily on ecological 
considerations: the threshold would need to be set such that enough of the focal biodiversity (e.g. 
extent of ecosystem; population of species) remained to allow for recovery to be feasible. However, 
establishing a compensation ratio (Maintenance) that can be practically implemented is another 
consideration here.  
 
The following equation allows for comparison of values for the intermediate threshold (𝐵𝐵𝐼𝐼), given 
input of different compensation ratios (Maintenance) (𝑀𝑀𝑚𝑚): 
𝐵𝐵𝐼𝐼 = (𝑥𝑥𝑝𝑝(0) + 𝑥𝑥(0)𝑀𝑀𝑚𝑚)/(1 + 𝑀𝑀𝑚𝑚) 
 
For example, where 𝑥𝑥𝑝𝑝(0) = 200 and 𝑥𝑥(0) = 1080, compensation ratios (Maintenance) (𝑀𝑀𝑚𝑚) of 
10, 5 and 1 would mean intermediate threshold values (𝐵𝐵𝐼𝐼) of 1000, 933 and 640, respectively. 
This calculation provides a means by which to select the intermediate threshold (𝐵𝐵𝐼𝐼) value that 
accounts for what can be practically implemented regarding maximum compensation ratios 
(Maintenance). Importantly, the lower the compensation ratio (and thus, intermediate threshold 
(𝐵𝐵𝐼𝐼) value), the greater amount of compensation (and thus the higher the compensation ratio) will 
be when the approach switches to Improvement. Again, the primary consideration must always be 
the ecological attributes of the specific biodiversity feature, and the landscape context in which that 
feature occurs. In other words, the intermediate threshold (𝐵𝐵𝐼𝐼), and the compensation ratio 𝑀𝑀𝑚𝑚 
must never be so low as to render recovery of the biodiversity feature, and enhancement through 
Improvement to achieve the ultimate No Net Loss or Net Gain target (𝐵𝐵), unfeasible. 
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Supporting Information 3 
Conservation planning and sustainable development considerations in target-based ecological 
compensation 
 
Trading up to higher conservation imperatives 
Target-based ecological compensation is well-aligned with other key conservation imperatives and 
broader sustainable development considerations. For example, in this target-based framework, 
‘trading up’ may be an option in certain circumstances. Trading up, or ‘out-of-kind’ trading refers to 
the practice of compensating for the loss of one particular biodiversity feature (at the development 
site) by benefiting another type of (generally greater conservation value) biodiversity feature 
elsewhere (Bull, Milner-Gulland, Suttle, & Singh, 2014; Moilanen & Kotiaho, 2018; Quétier & Lavorel, 
2011). Compensation for residual losses affecting biodiversity features that are above their target 
might be directed to other biodiversity features that are below their target. For example, 
Improvement actions to increase the amount and/or quality of the focal (below-target) biodiversity 
feature might be preferred over Maintenance actions focussed on the above-target feature. 
However, this would mean that the development-related losses of the impacted (above-target) 
biodiversity feature are not compensated, and so this type of ‘trading up’ would only be appropriate 
where these losses are carefully managed and strictly limited (e.g. by other regulatory instruments) 
to ensure that the ‘above target’ biodiversity feature does not decline below its target. 
Landscape level planning 
There is a need to move beyond what can be achieved by site-level planning for individual projects 
to consider development scenarios at a larger scale and assess the integrated opportunities for 
achieving better economic, social, and environmental outcomes (Kiesecker & Naugle, 2017). 
Landscape conservation plans designed to guide application of the mitigation hierarchy (Fitzsimons, 
Heiner, McKenney, Sochi, & Kiesecker, 2014; Kiesecker, Copeland, Pocewicz, & McKenney, 2010) and 
optimal habitat protection and restoration strategies (Possingham, Bode, & Klein, 2015) are needed 
to maintain critical levels of habitat amount and configurations and ensure viable conservation 
outcomes. The establishment of outcome-based biodiversity targets, and linking ecological 
compensation to the achievement of these targets, lends itself well to supporting broader, strategic 
development planning of this nature. Further, embedding mitigation decisions into strategic plans 
that also consider a range of future development scenarios (Evans & Kiesecker, 2014), can benefit 
governments, businesses and communities by supporting more informed development decisions. 
Planning at this larger scale also informs strategies for long-term landscape resilience, such as 
ensuring functional watersheds for clean drinking water (Evans & Kiesecker, 2014) and connected 
habitat for species (Monteith, Hayes, Kauffman, Copeland, & Sawyer, 2018) – strategic use of target-
based ecological compensation, with its explicit and transparent approach to determining 
compensatory requirements, has the potential to make important contributions to such endeavours.  
 
Impacts on people 
It is also crucial to recognise that biodiversity has social value, and so losses and gains in biodiversity 
resulting from development (and associated efforts to address biodiversity losses through the 
mitigation hierarchy), will affect people too—both positively and negatively (Bull, Baker, Griffiths, 
Jones, & Milner-Gulland, 2018; Griffiths, Bull, Baker, & Milner-Gulland, 2019; Sonter et al., 2018). 
People’s use and non-use values associated with biodiversity therefore need to be considered when 
(1) setting biodiversity conservation targets; and (2) designing and implementing ecological 
compensation to ensure they are equitable, socially acceptable and sustainable. Because the 
rationale behind the type and amount of ecological compensation required using the target-based 
approach can be readily explained and placed in the context of broader objectives (e.g. biodiversity 
conservation, ecosystem service provision), stakeholder understanding and engagement with the 
process may be improved by this framework. Considering people in the design of ecological 
compensation measures is necessary for moral reasons (e.g. human rights and ethical reasons), 
practical reasons (e.g. gaining a social licence to operate, or because of the need to ensure 
involvement of local people to enable compensatory actions to be delivered), and policy or 
regulatory requirements (BBOP, 2009; Bidaud et al., 2018; Bull et al., 2018; IFC, 2012). 
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